Lo and Chau, and independently Mayers, have shown that all quantum bit commitment schemes proposed to date are insecure: one or both participants can cheat if they have a quantum computer. They claim also to have demonstrated that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is impossible. However, their no-go arguments rely on models of quantum cryptographic protocols which are insufficiently general and on a tacit assumption which is not generally correct. We describe here a new quantum bit commitment protocol and prove that it is unconditionally secure if quantum theory is universally valid.
Introduction
Quantum information has very different properties from classical information.[e.g. 1] Understanding the relation between these two types of physical information is of great theoretical interest. It also promises to be of considerable practical importance. For instance, as is by now well known, quantum information, unlike classical information, can be used to send messages between two previously isolated parties, encrypted in a way that is unconditionally secure -that is, the probability of successfully eavesdropping, by employing any technology that respects the known laws of physics, can be made arbitrarily small. [2, 3] Protocols have been proposed for carrying out several other cryptographic tasks by quantum means, but none to date has been shown to be unconditionally secure. The case of quantum bit commitment is particularly interesting. In classical bit commitment protocols, one party, Alice, supplies an encoded bit to another, Bob. Alice tries to ensure that Bob cannot decode the bit until she reveals further information, while convincing Bob that she was genuinely committed all along. That is, Bob must be convinced that the protocol does not allow two different decodings of the bit which leave Alice free to reveal either 0 or 1, as she wishes. All classical bit commitment schemes are in principle insecure, though very good practical security can be attained. Several quantum bit commitment schemes have been proposed,[e.g. 3, 4, 5, 6] including some which were for a time generally believed to be unconditionally secure. That is, it was thought that it could be demonstrated that, if quantum theory is universally valid, then the probabilities of Alice successfully cheating and of Bob decoding the bit can both be made arbitrarily small using these schemes. However, all the schemes proposed to date were shown by Lo and Chau, [7, 8] and independently Mayers, [9, 10, 11] to be vulnerable to cheating.
These authors claim, more generally, to have proven that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is impossible. Their widely circulated conclusions have led to much gloom about the potential for new "post Cold War" applications of quantum cryptography, involving the transfer or trading of information between two or more parties who wish to retain more privacy than classical cryptography can guarantee. Lo and Chau, for example, take their arguments as a strong indication that, despite widespread early optimism, realistic post Cold War applications of quantum cryptography simply do not exist. [8] Several reasons are advanced for this pessimism. Bit commitment is a relatively simple cryptographic task, and some more interesting tasks, such as oblivious transfer, all-or-nothing disclosure of secrets, and certain types of multi-party computation, are known to be stronger, in the sense that they can also be used to perform bit commitment. Bit commitment also tends, in classical cryptography, to be used as a building block for more complicated protocols: it may be hard to carry out many interesting tasks without bit commitment, even if they are not (or are not known to be) stronger in the above sense. [12] Moreover, Lo has extended the earlier arguments, claiming to have proven that unconditional security is impossible for all one-sided two-party computations and for many two-sided two-party computations. [13] Mayers' and Lo and Chau's elegant demonstrations of insecurity are indeed valid for all the quantum bit commitment protocols proposed to date. However, their claims of generality are incorrect, as are Lo's later claims to give a general model of two-party computations. There are significant ways in which protocols can deviate from their models, and their bit commitment no-go argument relies on a tacit assumption which is not generally correct. All of the above-mentioned no-go theorems are false.
A new quantum bit commitment protocol is described below and shown to be unconditionally secure. Unconditionally secure protocols also exist for oblivious transfer, all-or-nothing disclosure of secrets, general one-sided or two-sided two-party computations and general multi-party computations. They will be described elsewhere, as will a more detailed analysis of the efficiency of the protocol described here and other unconditionally secure bit commitment protocols. [14] 
Quantum bit commitment
The protocol works by the exchange of qubits -quantum states in a two dimensional Hilbert space. Alice and Bob agree in advance to represent qubits by the physical properties of some particle -photon polarizations, or the spins of spin-1/2 nuclei, say. They agree on some basis |0 , |1 , and define the rotation
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The protocol runs as follows. Bob stipulates a number N B . Alice then stipulates a number N A >> N B . Alice prepares N B pairs of particles entangled in the singlet state
and (N A − N B ) particles in any states she chooses -they may be pure, or entangled with other particles, as she wishes. She sends Bob a total of N A particles, comprising these last (N A − N B ) and N B particles, one drawn from each singlet state, in a random sequence which she records but keeps private, so that Bob cannot tell which particles are which.
Bob carries out a von Neumann measurement on each particle, in one of the bases If not, she concludes that Bob is cheating, or that there is noise on the channel. She then abandons the protocol, having revealed nothing to Bob.
If Bob passes the tests, Alice concludes that he is following the protocol faithfully, or more precisely, that he is very probably following it very faithfully -sufficiently so to be acceptable to her.
She then proceeds to the bit commitment phase of the protocol, using the remaining N B pairs of particles. Of these, she returns the particles that Bob measured, without herself having measured or interfered with them in any way. These particles play no role in the bit commitment proper, but they are labelled, so that Bob knows how they are supposed to correspond to the particles he measured, and he checks that they are indeed in the states he measured. If not, he concludes that Alice is cheating, or that there is noise on the channel. He may then stop the protocol at this point.
Otherwise, Alice uses all N B of the partner particles to commit a single bit. If she wishes to commit a zero, then for each particle she chooses an independent random rotation from
each with probability one half, applies the rotation, and sends the particle to Bob. If she wishes to commit a one, then she first carries out a von Neumann measurement on each particle in the fixed basis |0 , |1 , then applies independent random rotations as above to the measured state, and sends the result to Bob. and (for added security) some random large numbers N 1 , N 2 , . . . , N N B , which she keeps private. Alice's choices are made so that she will feel adequately statistically confident of Bob's veracity before supplying the first particle, and of his continued veracity before supplying each subsequent particle: the N i might, for example, be chosen from a Gaussian distribution of mean N and standard deviation M , where M is large and N is of order 10M . She tests Bob's claims on N 1 states of her own choice, after which she randomly chooses state by state whether to test Bob's claims (with probability F = N B /N A ) or to send a particle entangled in a singlet (with probability (1 − F )). In the latter case, she returns Bob's measured state to him unaltered and carries out the bit commitment protocol on its partner. Having done this, she repeats the cycle, replacing N 1 by N 2 , and so on, until N B particles have been used for bit commitment.
Proof of unconditional security
Suppose, for definiteness, that the first version of the protocol is carried out.
Consider first Bob's cheating possibilities at the measurement stage. Bob can try to cheat by returning pure or entangled states different from those he measures, by making false declarations, or both.
For each state supplied to him, Bob must be prepared to report the result of a measurement in at least one of the six allowed bases to Alice. Consider, without loss of generality, a state for which he eventually decides to report the result of a measurement in the |0 , |1
basis. To be able to do so, he must have carried out operations which, from an input state a|0 + b|1 , produce the output
where the |ψ i are normalised states of a sub-system which remains under Bob's control, and the entangled second terms describe the particle he returns to Alice. In order to be able to reproduce the correct measurement statistics, the |ψ i must be orthogonal. Since
Bob's declaration includes either a |0 or a |1 , but not both, he must, to avoid risk of detection, also have carried out a measurement to tell whether his subsystem is in state |ψ 1 or |ψ 2 , thus reducing the state to an unentangled tensor product. In other words, to avoid any risk of detection, he must have followed the protocol.
To be more precise, let us say Bob cheats with frequency δ(ǫ) and deviation ǫ if a proportion δ(ǫ) of the states he returns differs from each of the declared states by more than ǫ, in the sense that the overlap between the state ρ of the particle returned to Alice -which may be mixed through entanglement -and the declared state |ψ D obeys
for each of the six declared states.
For any positive ǫ, δ and δ ′ that Alice chooses, she can choose N A sufficiently large that she will detect with probability (1 − δ ′ ) if Bob cheats with frequency ≥ δ(ǫ) and deviation ≥ ǫ. If Alice detects cheating, she stops the protocol at this point, having revealed nothing to Bob. If not, she can proceed secure in the knowledge that Bob's cheating is almost certainly limited by δ(ǫ) and ǫ. If Bob follows the protocol faithfully, Alice's random rotations ensure that he has no way of distinguishing between the commitment of a zero or a one. If Bob cheats, the information available to him depends continuously on the degree of entanglement which his returned states retain with sub-systems under his control. It follows that Alice can choose δ(ǫ) and ǫ so as to make the exploitable information potentially available to Bob in the later stages as close to zero as she wishes.
Suppose now that Bob follows his measurement protocol faithfully, but that Alice wishes to cheat by supplying states to Bob which allow her the choice of declaring either a zero or a one at the revelation stage. She can send whichever states she chooses for the (N A − N B ) particles used to test Bob's veracity. However, since Bob's measurements are chosen randomly and independently, she can gain no information from these states about his actions on the remaining N B states.
Let us label these states |ψ i (i = 1, . . . , N B ). It is easy to verify that there are positive bounds p 0 and f such that, whatever states -pure or entangled, random or non-random -Alice actually sends to Bob, for some fraction ≥ f of the |ψ i , her estimate of the probability of each of the declared states is ≥ p 0 . In other words, some fraction of the time, she will be significantly uncertain as to which of the six declared states has been returned to her.
Alice's first constraint is that, whether she commits a one or a zero, she effectively has to supply Bob with information that can only be obtained if she can obtain two copies of a state whose precise form is unknown to her. One copy of the state is immediately returned to Bob; the other copy (actually of the orthogonal state) is rotated and returned to him, either immediately or after a measurement. Only by sending Bob maximally entangled particles can she acquire two states with the required information. However, using maximally entangled particles considerably constrains her scope for cheating.
Thus, suppose that Alice sends Bob a particle belonging to a general entangled state
where the orthogonal |τ ± states correspond to a sub-system that remains under Alice's control and the |λ states, defined by
correspond to the particle sent to Bob. When Bob measures the particle in state |µ and returns it, Alice has, up to normalisation, the state
Returning |µ to Bob leaves her with
and to be able to reconstruct |µ with probability one, or to obtain accurate measurement statistics for |µ , she must have that
. By choosing N B sufficiently large and testing the particles returned to him, Bob can thus ensure that, for any parameters δ, ǫ that he chooses, if the N B bit committed states deviate from maximally entangled states by more than ǫ then his probability of detecting the fact will be at least (1 − δ).
We have assumed here that returning the state |µ constrains Alice so that she can only carry out ordinary unitary operations and measurements on the entangled sub-system. To justify this, and to consider her remaining cheating possibilities, we assume that quantum theory is universally valid. More precisely, we assume that all of Alice's possible actions, including measurements, can in principle be described by a linear evolution of uncollapsed quantum states, applying the projection postulate only at the revelation stage. While of course this may not be true, it is generally taken for granted in quantum information theory, on the grounds that a counterexample would demonstrate a limit to the validity of quantum theory as it is generally understood and take us into the realms of some postquantum information theory. We accept this definition of quantum information here.
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Note that delaying application of the projection postulate at this point causes no essential conflict with the protocol, since the only remaining cheating tests are on Alice.
Alice's most general option, then, is to supply Bob an entangled particle so that, if he follows the protocol and returns it with a declaration n, she possesses a total state which must take the form
for one of the six states |µ consistent with the declaration. Both states in the product belong to fixed two-dimensional spaces. She must act on (10) to produce an output of the form
where the |T states can describe a much larger sub-system, perhaps including Alice herself.
The |µ state is to be returned to Bob for testing, and another particle from the |T system is to be returned for bit commitment. Since all of Alice's actions are linear, and since at least some fraction of the time she cannot exclude |µ being any of the six declared states, the outputs |T n must depend linearly on the |τ n alone, as claimed above.
Suppose then that Alice does indeed use maximally entangled particles. Any maximally entangled pair can be transformed into any other by linear operations on her subsystem, so that it does not matter precisely which maximally entangled state Alice uses, or what precise form the sub-system takes. We may assume, without loss of generality, that she follows the protocol and uses entangled singlets of the same particle type. In attempting to cheat while committing a bit, she must find some operation which allows her later to reveal either a zero or a one. The operation is to be carried out on the partner particle, whose state α|0 + β|1 is known to be one of six possibilities. Her most general option is to arrange to produce an output state of the form
Here the first state in the products describes a sub-system, again perhaps including Alice, which we assume remains under Alice's control: if it does not, her cheating potential can only be diminished. The second state in the products describes the particle which she gives Bob. Unitarity implies that the two bracketed states must be normalised and orthogonal:
the individual |τ ab are not normalised and need not in general all be linearly independent or non-zero.
For Alice later to be able to reveal a one, in a way which will convince Bob, she must be able to carry out a measurement on the |τ states which reproduces the statistics of a measurement of the originally supplied state in the |0 , |1 basis. For this to be possible, the vector spaces spanned by {|τ 00 , |τ 01 } and by {|τ 10 , |τ 11 } must be orthogonal.
To be able to reveal a zero, she must either be able to declare a rotation without any further action, or else she must be able to carry out a measurement on the |τ states whose two possible outcomes allow her to declare rotations I and J respectively. To be specific, suppose that Bob's declaration includes the states |0 , U 2 |0 , U 4 |0 , none of which must be orthogonal. In the special case when one of the spaces has dimension zero, she can declare a rotation immediately; otherwise, she can do so after a measurement of any operator for which the two spaces are distinct eigenspaces.
If the spaces are orthogonal they cannot both be three-dimensional, since there are only four |τ ab . Hence there must be at least one linear relation among the |τ ab , which means that at most three of them are linearly independent, which means that at least one of the spaces spanned by (14) and (15) has dimension less than two, which means there are at least two independent linear relations among the |τ ab . For this to be consistent with the possibility of declaring a one, one of |τ 00 and |τ 01 must be zero, as must one of |τ 10 and |τ 11 be, and the two non-zero states must be orthogonal. This is incompatible with being able to declare a definite rotation if U 2 |0 or U 4 |0 was supplied.
If Bob stores the states returned to him by Alice and compares them with her claims at revelation, the probability of cheating being detected is thus non-zero.
Since the detection probability depends continuously on the inner product matrix of the |τ ab , and since the space of possible matrices is compact, there is a non-zero lower bound p 0 on the probability of cheating being detected for any given state. By choosing N B sufficiently large, Bob can thus ensure that the overall probability of his detecting cheating is as close to one as he wishes. If he measures both states returned to him, in random bases, before the revelation, he can still ensure this by comparing his measurement statistics against Alice's claims. A particularly simple way for him to do so is to choose randomly from the bases {U n |0 , U n |1 }, for n = 0, . . . , 5, so that at least one sixth of the time the basis chosen includes the state which Alice's declaration implies was returned.
More generally, since at every stage the detection probabilities depend continuously on the parameters characterising deviation from the protocol by either party, the protocol is unconditionally secure.
Comments
Like other quantum bit commitment protocols, this one requires Alice to give Bob quantum states encoding a 0 or a 1, with probabilistic codes chosen so that the corresponding mixed states ρ 0 and ρ 1 are equal. It exploits two loopholes in the published no-go theorems.
First, the analyses in the literature [8, 10] assume that any discussion of measurements can be postponed until after the revelation stage, simply by taking the quantum system sufficiently large -including Alice, Bob, and their laboratories, if necessary. Not so. Alice and Bob's actions can depend on the results of measurements, and while some types of measurement-dependent actions can be included in Lo and Chau's and Mayers' models, not all can. In particular, when the decision as to whether to proceed with the protocol depends on measurements, it cannot be accurately modelled by delaying the measurements until after a revelation that they may prevent.
Second, the analyses assume that Alice knows the codes for both one and zero. This might at first sight seem to follow from the definition of a bit commitment protocol, but it does not. Alice needs to know which actions to carry out to commit a one or zero but, having carried out one course of action, she need not necessarily know what states would have resulted from the other, or how to transform her commitment into the alternative.
For example, in the protocol above, Alice cannot cheat, essentially because she cannot know precisely which states Bob has left her with.
It will be seen that, even if Alice and Bob are honest, the protocol can fail at any of several stages if the channel is noisy. The same is true in principle of any bit commitment protocol, classical or quantum. Even if Alice and Bob exchange many classical messages to confirm a classical commitment in, say, the form of a product of two large primes, it is always theoretically possible that the same error will occur each time in Alice's messages to Bob, and will be negated by a compensating error in Bob's confirmatory replies to Alice.
Quantum bit commitment protocols are clearly more vulnerable; however, the protocol can be extended to make it noise-tolerant to a degree previously agreed by Alice and Bob.
The protocol is not designed to be optimal, in the sense of achieving any given level of security with the minimal number of qubits, of operations, or of entangled pairs. It would be interesting to obtain an optimal method.
From a theoretical point of view, though, the most important point is that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is possible. The practical cryptographic implications are considerable, since the protocol can also be adapted to implement unconditionally secure oblivious transfer and all-or-nothing disclosure of secrets, and used as a building block to implement general unconditionally secure m-sided n-party computations. [14] 
